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The Appropriateness of Default Investment Options in Defined 
Contribution Plans: Australian Evidence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: For participants in defined contribution (DC) plans who refrain from exercising 
investment choice, plan contributions are invested following the default 
investment option of their respective plans. Since default investment options of 
different plans vary widely in terms of their benchmark asset allocation, the most 
important determinant of investment performance, participants enrolled in these 
options face significantly different wealth outcomes at retirement. This paper 
simulates the terminal wealth outcomes under different static asset allocation 
strategies to evaluate their relative appeal as default investment choice in DC 
plans. We find that strategies with low or moderate allocation to stocks are 
consistently outperformed in terms of upside potential of exceeding the 
participant‟s wealth accumulation target at retirement as well as downside risk of 
falling below that target outcome by aggressive strategies whose allocation to 
stocks approach 100%. The risk of extremely adverse wealth outcomes for plan 
participants also does not appear to be very sensitive to asset allocation. Our 
evidence suggests the appropriateness of strategies heavily tilted towards stocks to 
be nominated as default investment options in DC plans unless plan providers 
emphasize predictability of wealth outcomes over adequacy of retirement wealth. 
 
JEL Code: G23, G11 
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The Appropriateness of Default Investment Options in Defined 
Contribution Plans: Australian Evidence 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
IN MOST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES, THE COINCIDENCE of a rapidly aging population with a rising 
proportion of retirees is placing considerable pressure on current social security programs. The 
situation has prompted policymakers to encourage funded private retirement plans (generally 
sponsored by employers or other private providers) known as defined contribution (DC) plans, 
where employee participants build up retirement savings through mandatory or voluntary 
contributions in their individual retirement accounts.  A growing trend in DC plans is to give the 
individual participants more control over investment of their plan assets.  This investment 
decision is critical because it determines future investment returns on their plan assets, and 
therefore, influences the wealth accumulated in the retirement account at the end of the 
participant‟s working life. 
A substantial body of recent research demonstrates that although members of retirement 
plans have the option to exercise choice, most accept the default arrangements in the plans.  In 
USA, Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and Metrick (2003) find that up to 80% of assets in different 
plans are invested in the default fund.  According to consulting firm Hewitt Bacon and 
Woodrow, around 80% of group personal pension scheme members in UK accept the default 
option provided by their plans (Bridgeland, 2002).  Similarly, Cronqvist and Thaler (2004) find 
that since 2003 only 10% of the new participants in Swedish retirement plans actually made any 
choice.  In Australia, nearly half of all of all retirement plan assets are invested in default 
investment options (APRA, 2008).  It seems that for a large majority of DC plan participants 
worldwide, the investment of plan contributions are dictated by the default arrangement of their 
respective plans. 
Given that most plan participants tend to accept default investment options in their plans, 
perhaps it is more important, from a practical standpoint, to question whether these default 
investment options are appropriately designed to meet the retirement goals of the participants.  
This issue has received little research interest, which is surprising because financial well being 
for majority of plan participants after retirement is directly linked to the performance of the 
 3 
default options.  Moreover, international evidence like Blake, Byrne, Cairns, and Dowd (2004) 
indicates that there is serious lack of agreement on this subject which is reflected in the wide 
disparity in benchmark asset allocation of default funds chosen by different plan providers.  
The question of appropriateness of the default options is no less pertinent for countries where 
these are less heterogeneous in terms of strategic asset allocation.  For instance, Utkus (2004) 
points out that majority of the plans in the United States (US) choose a money market or stable 
value fund as default investment option although and that such arrangements are inconsistent 
with two of the „prudent investor‟ principles on asset allocation underlying most participant 
education programs: first, the existence of positive equity risk premium; and, secondly, the 
change in the investor‟s risk-taking capacity with age.1 
The importance of asset allocation in influencing investment performance has been well 
demonstrated by many researchers (Brinson, Hood, and Beebower, 1986; Blake, Lehmann, and 
Timmermann, 1999).  Therefore, one would expect that the asset allocation strategies of default 
options are decided with utmost care - not only because a majority of participants passively 
accept the default options offered by their plans - but also considering that there is evidence 
(Madrian and Shea, 2001; Beshears, Choi, Laibson and Madrian, 2006) to suggest that many 
individuals perceive the default choice as recommendation or endorsement of a particular course 
of action by the provider.  This implies that once the participants get enrolled in the default 
option in their plans, they are also likely to persist with it for much of their working lives.   
In this paper, we examine the appropriateness of various asset allocation strategies adopted 
by DC plans in Australia as default options.  We find the case of Australian DC plans interesting 
for three reasons.  First, Australia has a well established private retirement system with 80% of 
all retirement plan assets allocated to DC plans (APRA, 2008).  Since 1992, the Australian 
Government has made it compulsory for all employers to make contributions to these plans 
(known as „superannuation funds‟) on behalf of their employees (members) at a minimum 
specified rate (currently 9% of wage and salary).  
Second, members in Australian superannuation funds directly confront the classical portfolio 
choice problem as they are expected to choose an asset allocation strategy (or a combination of 
                                                 
1 Utkus (2004) also observes that extant legal provisions permit investments that result in short-term losses to pursue long term 
gains and do not require the trustees to invest in „safe‟ assets. The Pension Protection Act of 2006 offers safe harbour relief to 
fiduciary liability to investment outcomes under certain conditions including one that specifies assets must be invested in a 
„qualified default investment alternative‟ as defined in the regulation.  
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strategies) from a menu of pre-selected asset allocation strategies provided by the plan providers 
to invest plan contributions.  This is different from say 401 (k) plans in USA where participants 
are offered a choice of mutual funds rather than actual asset classes.  Finally, to examine the 
issue of effectiveness of any strategic asset allocation policy in the context of wealth 
accumulation in DC plans, we need to consider its optimality from the perspective of an investor 
with long horizon, typically equalling the participant's employment life.  Unlike plans like 401 
(k) in USA that may allow distribution of account balances for participants who change jobs as 
well as include loan features against account balances, superannuation funds in Australia are 
prohibited from permitting withdrawal of superannuation assets by members before they reach 
the preservation age (currently 60 years for those born after June 1964).
2
  Therefore, the asset 
allocation structure of the default options offered by Australian pension funds can be expected to 
be designed from a truly long term perspective and less concerned with the impact of short term 
volatility in returns on the participant's account balance. 
Past research on DC plan investment choices have mostly examined hypothetical asset 
allocation strategies.  In contrast, our study considers asset allocation strategies which are based 
on those actually used by plan providers as default investment choices.  Unlike Poterba, Rauh, 
Venti, and Wise (2006) who attempt to rank wealth outcomes associated with different asset 
allocation strategies for 401(k) plans by using utility function of retirement wealth, we use risk-
adjusted performance measures to avoid making specific assumption about the form of the utility 
function of DC plan participants.  Also, in contrast to most other studies, we consider downside 
risk (the risk of the participants falling short of reaching their target wealth accumulation at 
retirement) as an important criterion in selecting an appropriate default strategy for DC plans.  
Since the risk of extreme events can also influence the plan providers‟ choice of default options, 
we rank asset allocation strategies in terms of their ability to reduce the potential and severity of 
the most adverse outcomes. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The following section discusses the 
metrics used to evaluate different asset allocation strategies. The next two sections describe the 
simulation methodology and the data. Subsequently we discuss the simulation results before 
providing concluding comments in the final section. 
 
                                                 
2 Restricted withdrawals are permitted in some extreme circumstances. 
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2. METRICS FOR EVALUATING RETIREMENT WEALTH OUTCOMES 
 
To evaluate asset allocation strategies and assess their appropriateness as default investment 
options in DC plans, we need to make plausible assumptions about the rationale that may guide 
the selection of a specific asset allocation strategy as default option from many competing 
candidates.  The basic motivation behind instituting retirement savings plans is to generate 
adequate income for the participating employees after retirement.  In that case, performance of 
DC plans should be measured in terms of their ability to generate sufficient retirement income 
(Baker, Logue, and Rader, 2005).  Therefore, the principal investment objective of such plans 
would be to maximize the terminal value of plan assets at the point of retirement since that 
would directly determine the amount of annuity the retiring employees are able to purchase for 
sustenance during post-retirement life.
3
  Past studies have mainly considered the absolute value 
of the participant‟s accumulated assets at retirement.  However, we employ a ratio which 
compares the terminal wealth of the participant‟s retirement account to their terminal income 
because it is very likely that the participant‟s post-retirement income expectations are closely 
linked to their immediate income before retirement.
4
  We call this measure the „retirement wealth 
ratio‟ (RWR).   
Higher estimates of different measures of RWR outcomes (like mean or median) do not 
automatically qualify a particular strategy to be selected as default option.  The trustees also need 
to consider the risk associated with investment of plan assets since participants would want a 
better exploitation of trade-off between risk and reward.  In this study we use shortfall below 
target outcomes (instead of variability of terminal wealth outcomes given by their standard 
deviation) as measure of risk. Since we assume that the ultimate goal of the DC plan participants 
is to attain a specific amount of wealth in DC plan account relative to their terminal income, 
which we call the target retirement wealth ratio ( TRWR ), the investment risk most relevant to 
participants is that of failure of their chosen asset allocation strategy to generate TRWR .
5
  Olsen 
                                                 
3
 Our choice of terminal wealth (instead of pension annuities) as a measure of retirement welfare is driven by the characteristics 
of Australian superannuation where retirement benefits are typically drawn as lump sum on retirement and not as annuities. 
4 This is supported by Booth and Yakoubov (2000), who employ a similar benchmark, that is, the value of the accumulation fund 
at retirement in terms of employee‟s salary.  In addition, this study uses a broader range of metrics in evaluating the risk-reward 
characteristics of the outcomes. 
5
 This type of „downside risk‟ is not new to economics and finance literature.  Roy (1952) developed the target rate of return 
approach in a portfolio selection context where the investor is concerned about minimizing the probability of falling below the 
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(1997) finds that two of the most important attributes of perceived investment risk are potential 
for below target returns and potential for large loss.  We capture these two risk attributes by 
employing downside risk and tail-related risk metrics respectively. 
In this paper, we employ the lower partial moment (Bawa, 1975; Fishburn, 1977) to measure 
downside risk of different asset allocation strategies.  LPM can represent different attitudes of 
pension fund members towards risk such as risk averse, risk seeking, and risk neutral.  If   
denotes the risk tolerance of the plan participant, then lower partial moment of retirement wealth 
outcomes is given by: 
 

 


n
t
tT RWRRWRMax
n
LPM
1
)](,0[
1
 [1] 
where TRWR  is the target outcome, tRWR is the outcome for the t-th observation, n is the number 
of observed RWR outcomes, and Max is the maximization function that selects the larger 
between the numbers 0 and )( tT RWRRWR  .  The term , which is known as the degree of LPM 
can theoretically assume any value depending on the risk aversion of the participant. 
We compute the lower partial moments for wealth outcomes under different asset 
allocation strategies for participants with  = 0, 1, and 2.  For   = 0, 0LPM  gives the 
probability of shortfall, that is, how often the return can fall below the target although it does not 
consider how severe the shortfall is likely to be.  If  = 1, 1LPM  weighs shortfalls ( TRWR  less 
„below TRWR ‟ outcomes in the context of our problem) with linear weighting.  This, therefore, 
gives the expected shortfall of the strategy.  For = 2, 2LPM  gives the below-target or downside 
semi-variance.  The choice of appropriate shortfall measure may be guided by the investor‟s 
degree of risk aversion (Bawa 1978, Harlow and Rao, 1989) with risk-averse investors choosing 
LPM with   > 0. 
We also use performance measures which are adjusted for downside risk in evaluating 
alternative asset allocation strategies.  The concept of downside deviation has been used to 
suggest several risk-adjusted performance measures, the most well-known among which is the 
Sortino ratio (SR) introduced by Sortino and Price (1994).  This is given by: 
                                                                                                                                                             
disaster level or minimum acceptable rate of return.  Since then researchers have found evidence of decision makers conceiving 
risk as the possibility of outcomes below target (eg. Mao, 1970; Olsen, 1997)   
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where MRWR  denotes the mean RWR. Due to its use of downside deviation as measure of risk, it 
does not penalise performance for volatility above the investor's target unlike the Sharpe ratio. 
Further, Sortino, van der Meer, and Plantinga (1999) propose a performance statistic that 
replaces the excess of mean above target in Sortino ratio with the upside potential of the 
investment, a probability weighted summation of all outcomes which are above the target.
6
  This 
gives the upside potential ratio (UPR). In the context of our problem: 
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Next, we consider the risk of extremely adverse wealth outcomes for plan participants.  
Rabin and Thaler (2001) show that reasonable degrees of risk aversion for small and moderate 
stakes imply unreasonable high degrees of risk aversion for large stakes.  If DC plan participants 
are believed to be loss averse towards the value of their retirement assets, which can be 
considered as a „large stake‟, the plan sponsors may decide to select asset allocation strategies 
that have more chance of avoiding the most disastrous outcomes i.e. minimize tail risk. To 
evaluate the extreme retirement wealth outcomes of alternative asset allocation strategies, we use 
two common measures of estimating tail risk - value at risk (VaR) and expected tail loss (ETL).  
In the context of our problem, if p represents the probability of worst percentage of RWR 
outcomes that the participants are concerned about, is the confidence level and p is set such 
that 1p , and if pQ represents the p-quantile of the RWR distribution, then the VaR at that 
confidence level is given by: 
 pQVaR   [4] 
We specify  at 95%, which indicates the likelihood that the investor would not get an outcome 
worse than VaR.  We also measure Expected Tail Loss (ETL), which is often proposed as a 
better candidate than VaR as a coherent risk measure (Artzner, Delbaen, Eber, and Heath, 1999). 
ETL  gives the probability weighted average of estimates that fall below VaR.  In our case, if 
                                                 
6
 This is consistent with findings by behavioural finance researchers like Statman and Shefrin (2000) who claim that 
investors seek upside potential from investments while protecting the downside. 
 8 
iRWR  is the i th outcome and ip is the probability of the i th outcome, then: 
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 [5]  
Since we have specified   at 95%, ETL is actually the average of the worst 5% of the RWR 
outcomes. 
Although we do not see variability of retirement wealth outcomes as risk perceived by plan 
participants, we use two common measures of dispersion.  First, we estimate coefficient of 
variation (CV) for retirement wealth outcomes under every strategy which is the standard 
deviation of RWR outcomes divided by the mean RWR.  To supplement this metric, we also 
estimate the inter-quartile range ratio (IQRR) which is obtained by dividing the difference 
between the 75th percentile RWR and the 25th percentile RWR by the median RWR for each 
strategy under consideration. 
 
3. MODEL FOR GENERATING RETIREMENT WEALTH OUTCOMES 
 
To analyse the distribution of wealth outcomes generated by different asset allocation 
strategies, we use a simple DC plan accumulation model which uses stochastic simulation of 
asset class returns to determine the expected distribution of wealth outcome at retirement.
7
  As 
discussed in previous section, the wealth outcome is measured as retirement wealth ratio (RWR).  
The terminal value of DC plan assets is given by: 
 
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where: W = value of plan assets accumulated at the point of retirement 
 k  = Plan contribution rate 
 te  = Employment state in year t 
 tS  = Annual salary in year t 
 tr  = Real rate of investment return earned in year t 
 R  = Number of years in the plan before retirement 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
7
 Stochastic simulation is the preferred method of estimation when dealing with this type of complex situation 
involving future uncertainties or risk (Dowd and Blake, 2006) 
 9 
 
To estimate W, we need to model the: (i) contribution cash flows; and, (ii) investment 
returns for each period.  The contribution cash flows depend on annual salary, contribution rate, 
and probability of unemployment in any period.  The annual salary for any year, in turn, depends 
on starting wage, wage growth rate, and the number of years elapsed since commencing 
employment.  This is given by: 
 10 )1(
 tt gSS  [7] 
where 0S  is the starting wage of the plan participant and g is the real wage growth rate.  
Investment returns are dependent on returns on individual asset classes (included in the 
portfolio) and the weights assigned to them.  The latter is determined by the asset allocation 
strategy of the plan.  Mathematically: 
  titit rwr ,,  [8] 
where: tiw ,   is the weight assigned to the 
thi  asset in year t and  tir ,  is the real return on the 
thi asset in year t. 
We base our analysis on simulated wealth outcomes for an employee who joins the plan 
at the age of 25 years and retires at the age of 65 years.  The starting salary of the employee is 
assumed to be 25,000 Australian Dollars and the growth in real wages to be 2% per year, which 
closely follows growth rate of Australia's real GDP per capita of 2.6% per annum from 1994 
through 2004 (ABS, 2005).  The contribution rate is fixed at 9% which is the legislated minimum 
prescribed by the Australian government.  Employment state is modelled as a binary variable (0, 
1). No contribution is made during periods of unemployment, the probability of which is 
assumed to be 5%, which is equal to the unemployment rate among Australian workers with 
post-school qualifications (Kryger, 1999; Richardson, 2006).  For the sake of simplicity, we 
assume that the contributions are credited annually to the accumulation fund at the end of every 
year.  The portfolios are also rebalanced at the end of each year to maintain the target asset 
allocation.  We ignore any taxes payable on investment returns and transaction costs that may be 
incurred in managing the investments. 
To generate tir , , we employ two different methods: Monte Carlo and bootstrapping. This 
helps us to check the robustness of our results. Monte Carlo method estimates statistical 
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parameters from historical data series under assumed theoretical distribution and then exposes 
these to random changes in simulating future outcomes. Following standard Monte Carlo 
simulation methodology, we assume that asset class returns are drawn from a multivariate 
normal distribution.  This implies that mean and standard deviation of asset class returns are time 
invariant and the returns are independent over the time horizon.  At each stage of the simulation 
horizon, the random shocks generated by the multivariate normal model are adjusted so as to 
follow the average cross-sectional correlation observed in the historical data. The correlation-
based dependence structure for Monte Carlo analysis is derived through Cholesky 
decomposition. If  ijlL 1  is the lower-triangular Cholesky decomposition of the correlation 
matrix ,C  i  be mean return on the asset ,i  and i  be the standard deviation of return on asset 
,i  then for a portfolio of n assets, the multivariate normal Monte Carlo model dictates that  



n
j
jiji lZ
1
        [9] 
where   denotes an independent standard normal random variable (i.i.d. ))1,0(N and where iZ  
represents a correlated standard normal variable for asset i . The simulated return on asset i is 
then obtained as  
iiii Zr         [10] 
Having selected the model for generating simulated returns, the required parameters – means, 
standard deviations, and correlations- are estimated from historical returns data which is 
described in the next section. 
For bootstrap simulations, asset class returns are drawn from the empirical return 
distribution. Here we randomly resample with replacement vectors from the matrix of annual 
asset class returns time series to generate portfolio returns for every period of the 40 year 
investment horizon of the DC plan participant. In other words, each bootstrap sample is a 
random sample of asset class returns for a particular period drawn with replacement from 
historical observations over several periods. Thus we retain the cross-correlation between the 
asset class returns as given by the historical data while assuming that asset class return series is 
independently distributed over time.    
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4. DATA 
 
To investigate the issue of strategic asset allocation for long horizon investors like DC plan 
participants it is essential that we generate simulated returns based on historical observations of 
asset class returns over several decades.  This is done to minimize the undue influence that recent 
investment performances (of these asset classes) on asset allocation decisions. Longer period of 
data has greater chance of capturing wide-ranging effects of favourable and unfavourable events 
of history on returns of individual asset classes.  Since participants are likely to be concerned 
with the effect of inflation on the value of their retirement wealth, we have used an updated 
version of the dataset of real annual returns on stocks, bonds, and bills originally compiled by 
Dimson, Marsh, and Staunton (2002) and commercially available through Ibbotson Associates 
for 16 countries including Australia for a period of 105 years spanning from 1900 to 2004.  All 
returns include reinvested income and capital gains. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 1a ABOUT HERE] 
 
[INSERT TABLE 1b ABOUT HERE] 
 
 
Table 1a presents the summary statistics for the real returns from the three asset classes. 
For the full 105 year period from 1900 to 2004, the mean annual real return for Australian stocks 
has been 9.09% while the same for Australian bonds and bills has been 2.27% and 0.72% 
respectively.
8
  When we consider only data after the Second World War, from 1947 through 
2004, the mean annual real returns for the three asset classes were smaller, recorded at 8.05%, 
1.08%, and 0.62% for stocks, bonds, and bills respectively.  However, real returns for all three 
classes seem to have been significantly higher in recent times.  During the most recent 30 year 
period in our dataset, 1975 through 2004, mean annual real returns for stocks, bonds, and bills 
have been 10.93%, 4.97%, and 3.20% respectively.   
Expectedly, the higher mean real returns from stocks also results in higher standard 
deviation in comparison to the returns from bonds and bills.  The standard deviation of annual 
real returns on stocks, bonds, and bills has been 17.74%, 13.36%, and 5.51% from 1900 through 
                                                 
8 A recent study by Brailsford, Handley, and Maheswaran (2008) estimates slightly lower equity premium over bonds and bills 
for the period 1883-2005 than that suggested by our data for the period 1900-2004. 
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2004.  The corresponding estimates for post war period (1947-2004) were 21.06%, 11.47%, and 
5.09% while those for most recent 30-year period (1975-2004) were 20.54%, 11.13%, and 
3.76%. 
The correlation between the three asset classes are provided in Table 1b. For the full 
period (1900-2004) data, stocks show weak positive correlation with both bonds and bills at 
0.3389 and 0.2524 respectively. The correlation between bonds and bills is, expectedly, stronger 
at 0.6344. For the post war period (1947-2004), there is very little change in these cross asset 
correlations from those observed in the full period data. However, during the most recent 30-year 
period, the correlations between the three asset classes drop significantly. The correlations 
between stocks and the fixed income asset categories are almost non-existent during this period 
(0.05 with bonds and -0.06 with bills). The correlation between bonds and bills also decline to 
0.42. 
Since DC plan participants have long investment horizons, typically between 30 and 40 
years, we calculate the holding period returns for the different asset classes over such periods.  
From 1900 through to 2004, there are 76 overlapping 30 year holding periods and 66 overlapping 
40 year holding periods. We find that the real returns from bonds have been negative for 29 of 
the 76 observed 30 year holding periods and for 20 out of 66 observed 40-year holding periods.  
Bills recorded further underperformance with 32 of the 76 observed 30-year holding periods and 
20 of the 66 observed 40-year holding periods yielding negative real returns for the investors.  In 
contrast, the real returns from Australian stocks for every 30-year and 40-year holding period 
between 1900 and 2004 were positive.  The real equity premium over bond and bills has also 
been positive for each of these holding periods. It is, however, to be borne in mind that these 30 
year and 40 year holding periods within the historical data are overlapping and therefore returns 
from the asset classes for different periods are not independent of each other.  
We examine data on default investment strategy for major Australian superannuation 
funds.
9
  Most superannuation funds offer a balanced diversified investment strategy to their 
member participants as the default investment choice. At the end of June 2008, the majority of 
default strategy assets of superannuation funds were held in stocks: 29.3% in Australian stocks 
and 22.7% in international stocks.  A further 10.6% was invested in Australian fixed interest, 
                                                 
9 In Australia, it is a regulatory requirement for trustees to identify a default strategy where investment choice is offered to 
standard employer-sponsored members. 
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5.7% in international fixed interest, 8.6% in cash, 10% in listed and unlisted property, and 13% 
in other assets (APRA, 2008). In 2005-06, SuperRatings, an independent research house, 
conducted a comprehensive analysis of 120 superannuation funds most of which hold more than 
$500 million of assets.
10
 Together, the funds covered in excess of $300 billion of retirement 
savings on behalf of nearly 10 million member accounts.  The funds were rated on the basis of 
their performance by aggregating several factors including investment methodology, returns, 
fees, administration and governance/risk framework. Seventeen of these funds (representing the 
top 15% of their universe) received the highest or „platinum‟ rating.  An examination of the asset 
allocation data for individual default investment strategies for these „platinum rated‟ funds 
revealed that allocation ranged from 64% to 93% for stocks, from 4% to 36% for bonds, and 
from nil to15% for cash.
11
 Most Australian superannuation funds offer static fixed weight 
allocation strategies as investment options to members.  Of the seventeen platinum rated funds 
mentioned above, only three were found to change the asset allocation of their default investment 
strategies with the age of the participant.   
Out of the seventeen „platinum‟ rated funds used in our analysis, default options of eight 
funds allocated less than 70% of their assets to stocks which typically represents a balanced 
diversified fund.  Four funds had their default strategy‟s allocation to stocks between 70% and 
80% while the default strategies of remaining five funds had more than 80% of assets invested to 
stocks. Based on the observed asset allocation of the default options of these seventeen „platinum 
rated‟ funds, we form three stylised default asset allocation strategies. The first of these is called 
a „defensive‟ strategy which represents the average allocation of the default options of the eight 
funds with less than 70% allocation to stocks. The next one is called a „moderate‟ strategy and it 
has the average asset allocation of the default options of the four funds whose allocation to 
equities range from 70% to less than 80%. Finally, we form an „aggressive‟ strategy which 
represents the average allocation of the default options of the five funds with 80% or more 
allocated to equities. In addition, we examine two hypothetical strategies: (i) default option 
average (DOA) strategy whose allocation is the same as the average allocation of default options 
for all Australian superannuation funds as of June 2004 (APRA, 2005); and, (ii) the 100% stocks 
                                                 
10 More details of the survey and rankings are available on SuperRating‟s website, www.superratings.com.au 
11
 The information is collected from the product disclosure statements available in the respective websites of these funds as on 
March 2006. These funds are not named individually with their individual asset allocations in this paper. However, the same can 
be made available by the authors on request. 
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strategy. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Initially we conduct our analysis under the assumption that the DC plan assets are invested in 
Australian stocks, bonds, and bills.  Allocations of the default options to international stocks and 
international bonds are, therefore, included in domestic stocks and bonds respectively.  We, later, 
repeat the simulations by including international stocks and international bonds as separate asset 
classes but do not present the results here since these lead to very similar conclusions.
12
  
Although „property‟ is an important asset class for investment by these funds, we do not include 
it as a separate asset class in our analysis because of the paucity of reliable long-term return data.  
Similarly „alternative investments‟ cannot be included because of the lack of specific information 
on their composition and therefore of any reliable index to measure returns.  While examining 
investment strategies of Australian superannuation funds, we handle their allocation component 
to „properties‟ and „alternative investments‟ in a manner similar to that of other well-known 
studies like Brinson et. al., (1986) and Arshanapalli, Coggin, and Nelson (2001), where the 
percentage allotted to „others‟ is divided between equities, bonds and bills on a pro-rata basis.  
However, we choose to direct the allocations against „property‟ and „alternative investments‟ 
only to equities and bonds (and not bills) on a pro-rata basis, because we believe that the risk-
return profile of these asset classes is far removed from that of bills (cash).  The asset allocations 
for all five strategies included in our analysis are provided in Table 2. 
 
 
5. SIMULATION EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS 
 
Based on the wealth accumulation model described earlier, we simulate RWR outcome for 
all the five asset allocation strategies. For both Monte Carlo and Bootstrap sets of experiments, 
we conduct 5,000 iterations for every asset allocation strategy under consideration to generate 
5,000 different investment return paths over 40-year periods.  These simulated returns are 
                                                 
12  This may be due to the reason that we use US stocks and US bonds, which are highly correlated with their Australian 
counterparts, as proxies for international stocks and international bonds. 
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applied every year on corresponding cash flows in the participant‟s account to produce a range of 
5,000 RWR outcomes under every strategy at the end of the 40-year horizon.  Each set of 
experiments is initially conducted based on historical asset class returns for the entire period of 
available data, 1900 through 2004.  However, it is quite possible that structural changes in the 
domestic and the international economy may render data from the very distant past, especially 
before the Second World War, less relevant in projecting future asset class returns.  Therefore, 
we repeat the simulations using two more recent datasets: one for the entire post-war period 
(1947-2004) and another for the most recent 30 year period (1975-2004).  Since the estimates 
obtained by the Monte Carlo and the bootstrap resampling experiments are very similar, we 
report only the results of the former in Tables 3, 4, and 5.
13
  
 
We set the wealth accumulation target TRWR  for the plan participant at 8.0 i.e. 800% of salary at 
retirement.  Booth and Yakoubov (2000) uses a target wealth of 500% of salary at retirement 
which translates into a TRWR  of 5.0.  Although there is no consensus on what can be considered 
as an adequate wealth to income ratio for Australian retirees, we choose to set TRWR at a higher 
level for two reasons.  First, several commentators consider the current wealth to income levels 
as grossly inadequate in view of increasing life expectancy and growing health care costs.  
Second, since our study ignores the taxes on retirement savings and investment returns as well as 
transaction costs while modelling terminal wealth outcomes, we feel the need to compensate it 
by setting the target wealth outcome on the higher side.  However, setting TRWR at a different 
value is not expected to alter the relative ranking of asset allocation strategies as long as we hold 
it constant for all the simulations. 
 
A. RWR Distribution 
 
The distribution of RWR for each asset allocation strategy provides us with the range of 
wealth outcomes the participant may expect to confront at the point of retirement.  In addition to 
mean and median RWR, we estimate the first and third quartile estimates of the distribution for 
every allocation strategy to assess their relative appeal.  Table 3 provides the distribution 
                                                 
13 Results of the bootstrap resampling experiments can be obtained by contacting the authors. 
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parameters of RWR for each of the asset allocation strategies.  The results indicate that RWR 
varies significantly across asset allocation strategies.  The mean and the median RWR seem to 
increase for strategies with higher allocation to stocks and are highest for the strategy which 
invests entirely in stocks.  The median RWR for the 100% stocks strategy is over 50% higher 
than that of DOA strategy, which only has two-thirds of assets invested in stocks.   
 
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The first and third quartile outcomes also tend to increase as we move from strategies 
with lower proportion of stocks to those with higher proportion of stocks.  The difference 
between first quartile outcomes of different strategies are relatively smaller compared to the 
spread between the third quartile outcomes.  For example, the first quartile outcomes for the 
defensive and aggressive strategies are 5.80 and 6.98 respectively.  The corresponding estimates 
for their third quartile outcomes are 12.17 and 16.98.  Again, the 100% stocks strategy results in 
the best first and third quartile RWR outcomes.  The aggressive strategy has higher maximum 
RWR outcome relative to moderate and defensive strategy.  It also has the same minimum RWR 
outcome as that of the defensive strategy and slightly higher than that of the moderate strategy. 
Also, the minimum outcomes for different strategies lie within a narrow range (0.57 to 1.13) 
which shows that there is not much to choose between the strategies on the basis of their worst 
(out of 5000) outcomes. 
The results of Monte Carlo simulations using returns data for 1947-2004 and 1975-2004 
give similar indications about the effect of asset allocation strategies on terminal wealth 
outcomes.  While the RWR estimates for various strategies vary when we use data for different 
periods, strategies with higher allocations to stocks consistently dominate those with lower 
allocation to stocks in terms of mean, median, first quartile, and third quartile outcomes.  As 
before, the 100% stocks strategy result in the best outcomes for all these parameters except the 
first quartile outcome for the simulations using 1975-2004 data where the best result is produced 
by the aggressive strategy. 
  Our simulations produce a range of possible RWR outcomes for every strategy.  The 
estimates for both CV and IQRR indicate that the dispersion of RWR outcomes tends to increase 
with higher allocation to stocks although the rate of increase seems to be very small.  For 
instance, the IQRR for the defensive strategy is 0.76 while that for the aggressive strategy is 
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0.92.  The 100% stocks strategy produces an IQRR of 1.06.  These estimates indicate that the 
disparity in wealth outcomes between the cohorts who meet very positive investment return 
scenarios and those who confront relatively unfavourable investment returns during their 
employment life while being enrolled in the same default option may be dependent on the 
allocation policy of the plan.  Nevertheless, the difference in disparity across cohorts for 
strategies with different proportions of stocks does not appear to be very large.  The simulation 
results using data for recent periods also support these findings. 
 
B. Downside Risk and Risk-Adjusted Performance Estimates 
 
We use lower partial moments with risk aversion parameters 0, 1, and 2 so that the 
investors with different levels of risk tolerance can use these estimates to evaluate alternative 
asset allocation strategies.  Table 4 reports the downside risk estimates for RWR under different 
asset allocation strategies.  
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Estimates for all the LPM measures steadily increase with decrease in allocation to stocks 
indicating a clear inverse relationship.  For instance, the 0LPM for the defensive strategy with 
66% allocation to stocks is 0.4719 which indicates that there is a 47.19% probability that the 
RWR would fall below TRWR .  In comparison, the probability of shortfall for the moderate 
strategy with 76% stocks is 0.392 and for the aggressive strategy with 85% stocks is 0.324.  
Interestingly, the 100% stocks strategy has only 0.2622, or around one-in-four, probability of 
falling below TRWR  , which is the lowest of all strategies, while DOA strategy has almost 47% 
chance of underperforming that target.   
Similar trends are also observed for measures of magnitude of shortfall )( 1LPM and 
below target semivariance )( 2LPM  indicating that the downside risk gets reduced by increasing 
allocation to stocks in the portfolio.  In fact, the decline in downside risk with increased exposure 
to stocks appears to be more pronounced for the higher order LPM measures i.e. more averse the 
participants are to the downside risk of failing to meet their wealth accumulation objective, more 
appealing would the aggressive strategies be relative to moderate or defensive strategies. 
Simulation results using post-war data also suggest that LPM estimates are smaller for 
 18 
strategies with higher allocation to stocks.  However, the results are not as conclusive when we 
use recent 30-year returns (1975-2004) data as simulation input.  While the 0LPM estimates are 
still lower for more aggressive strategies, albeit by a much smaller margin, this is not true for 
1LPM  and 2LPM .  The estimates for 1LPM  do not exhibit any clear trend with similar 
estimates observed for strategies with significantly different proportion of stocks.  For 2LPM , the 
estimates are generally lower for strategies holding lower proportion of stocks.   
While the terminal wealth outcomes and associated risks involved with each allocation 
strategy under consideration can be assessed from the parameters of the simulated RWR 
distribution and various measures of LPM, composite performance measures are essential to rank 
the strategies based on overall risk-reward profile.  We compute estimates for SR and UPR, 
performance measures that are adjusted for downside risk and also produce these results in Table 
4. For simulations using full period data, SR and UPR are generally found to increase with rising 
proportion of stocks in the strategy.  The 100% stocks strategy results in the highest SR and 
UPR.   
The above results come as no surprise since we earlier found strategies with higher stock 
allocation to be superior in terms of terminal wealth outcomes as well as downside risk based on 
our simulation with the full period (as well as post war period) data.  Of more interest is the 
performance estimates for simulations using data for the recent 30 year sub-period because 
downside risk estimates in its case lead to different conclusions for 1LPM  and 2LPM . However, 
we find that the risk-adjusted performance estimates for the sub-periods are supportive of the 
rankings indicated by the full-period simulation.  Estimates for both SR and UPR in these cases 
indicate that an allocation rule dominated by stocks results in better risk adjusted performance 
and therefore, are consistent with the findings based on simulation using full period data. 
 
C. Tail-Related Risk Estimates 
 
As discussed previously in this paper, it is plausible that plan participants may care more 
about the most adverse outcomes that can occur for a given strategy. Plan providers in that case 
are likely to select a strategy which maximizes the worst „n’ percentile of outcomes.  In this 
paper, we estimate VaR and ETL at 95% confidence level, which means we assume that the 
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participants are concerned about the worst 5% of RWR outcomes.
14
  For participants who are 
concerned about outcomes falling below 5
th
 percentile, the ETL measure provides the expected 
value of such an outcome. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The results for VaR and ETL estimates are produced in Table 5.  The results for 
simulations using full period data do not show a clear trend.  More importantly, it is observed 
that the difference between the VaR estimates of different asset allocation strategies is very 
small. The lowest observed VaR estimate is 3.3936 given by the defensive strategy. This means 
that by employing this strategy there is a 5% (or one-in-twenty) chance of the RWR falling 
below 3.3936.  At 3.3961, the aggressive strategy fares marginally better. The highest VaR 
estimate (4.0033) is produced by the 100% stocks strategy which goes against the conventional 
logic that stocks, being most volatile among the asset classes, can potentially result in the most 
adverse outcomes.  The results for ETL also support these conclusions. 
The simulation results based on data for other periods present a slightly different picture 
but do not alter the fundamental conclusion of the previous simulation.  Using data for 1947-
2004 period, the VaR estimates of the strategies are found to lie within a very close range 
(2.4100-2.5638) and do not seem to follow any clear pattern.  The 100% stocks strategy produces 
a VaR estimate of 2.41 which is almost the same as that of the defensive strategy but slightly 
lower than that of DOA strategy which produces a VaR estimate of 2.5196.  The moderate 
strategy produces the highest estimates for both the VaR and the ETL.   
Simulation with data for 1975-2004 period results for VaR and ETL estimates also 
presents a mixed picture.  The range of VaR estimates for different strategies is still very narrow.  
The lowest estimate of 4.3970 is given by the 100% stocks strategy while the highest estimate of 
5.27 is produced by the moderate strategy.  It is easy to see that the gap between these two 
situations can hardly be considered as the difference between a ruinous and a non-ruinous 
outcome.  This is confirmed by the ETL estimates which range from 3.2636 to 4.2175 indicating 
even the below 5% outcomes are not very different between different allocation strategies.  Thus 
our evidence clearly implies that the risk of confronting extremely poor retirement wealth 
                                                 
14
 While it is theoretically possible that some participants may have greater degree of extreme risk aversion and consider RWR 
outcomes below an even lower threshold (say 1%), we believe the 5th percentile outcome would be adequate for majority of 
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outcomes may not be very sensitive to the choice of asset allocation strategy.  
Our results, undoubtedly, have been influenced by the large premium that Australian 
stocks have enjoyed historically over bonds and bills.  By using long term return data for asset 
classes over a hundred years, we have attempted to ensure that our results are not biased by 
returns for any asset class in a particularly favourable (or unfavourable) period.  Yet, as many 
commentators have observed, even a century long dataset may be inadequate to predict the entire 
gamut of future possibilities. Many financial economists in recent years have also opined that the 
high returns from equity investments experienced in the twentieth century are unlikely to be 
repeated. For example, Siegel (2002) expects future real returns on stocks to be lower by 1- 2%. 
Dimson et al. (2002) estimates the average future equity risk premium for 16 countries including 
Australia and indicates an expected fall by 1.8% from historical risk premium.  
Following other simulation studies like Shiller (2005) and Poterba et al (2006), we run a 
repeat set of Monte Carlo trials by lowering the returns on Australian stocks for every year in our 
data set by 2%.
15
 Expectedly, this set of trials produces lower retirement wealth estimates for all 
strategies under consideration as they have significant, albeit varying degree of allocation to 
equities. The gaps between different RWR estimates of the aggressive strategies and those of the 
relatively conservative strategies in our dataset, however, show a marked decline. For example, 
the median RWR for 100% stocks strategy is now 33% higher compared to the DOA strategy 
while in the previous set of simulations with unadjusted equity premium, the former 
outperformed the latter by 50%.  
The results for downside risk and tail risk estimates tell a similar story. With the downward 
revision of equity premium, the probability of falling below TRWR increases for all the strategies. 
The 100% stocks strategy still comes out as the best performer with about 48% probability of 
shortfall while the DOA strategy is way behind at 68%. Again the aggressive strategy fares better 
than the moderate or defensive strategies on downside risk adjusted basis as given by the 
estimates for Sortino and UPR. In terms of VaR and ETL, however, the estimates for different 
asset allocation strategies are extremely close. The DOA strategy produces VaR and ETL 
estimates of 2.72 and 2.30 respectively which are marginally higher than the corresponding 
                                                                                                                                                             
participants. 
15
 These studies conduct two parallel sets of simulations: one with historical returns on stock, bond, and bills and an alternative 
series where returns on stocks are reduced by a few percentage points (2-3%) to allow for the possibility of smaller equity 
premium in future. 
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estimates of 2.66 and 2.11 produced by the 100% stocks strategy.
16
 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
Given the fact that Australian stocks have significantly outperformed fixed income securities 
over long horizons in the past, it is no surprise that differences between various default 
investment options with respect to their exposure to stocks result in large differences in 
simulated terminal wealth outcomes for DC plan participants.  More revealing is our finding that 
very high allocations to stocks may actually prove to be less risky on most occasions if risk is 
viewed in the context of falling short of the participant‟s wealth accumulation target, in terms of 
both probability and magnitude of shortfall.  Our findings, although based on simulated wealth 
outcomes using historical return data for Australian asset classes, may have important 
implications for retirement plans in other industrialised nations as the returns on various asset 
classes in many of these markets have displayed broadly similar trends over the last century 
(Dimson et. al., 2002). 
At present, regulators in most countries, including Australia, do not prescribe any asset 
allocation structure for default investment options.  But very often they emphasise the 
importance of diversification in coping with risk by optimizing its trade-off with returns.  Our 
results, however, show that very long term investors like DC plan participants have higher 
likelihood of being better off by concentrating their investments in stocks alone.  We have 
demonstrated that the strategies that are heavily tilted towards stocks not only reduce the chance 
of failure in meeting the participants‟ wealth accumulation target but also seem to diminish the 
extent of shortfall in case the participants fail to achieve such objective.  At the same time, they 
seem to offer strong upside potential of generating terminal wealth outcomes that outperform the 
participant's accumulation target at retirement. It seems that balanced diversified strategies 
nominated by many plan providers in Australia as default investment options, which bears close 
resemblance to the „defensive‟ strategy in our paper, may not be well suited to optimise the 
retirement benefits of the participants.  The problem may be even more serious for countries like 
the USA, where DC plans have typically adopted an even more conservative approach in 
designing their default option.   
                                                 
16 The full results for this set of simulation trials can be made available by the authors on request. 
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Perhaps the most powerful evidence against selecting balanced diversified strategies or even 
moderately aggressive strategies as default options is provided by our results for tail-related risk.  
As stock returns are essentially considered to be more volatile than other asset class returns, one 
would have normally expected their presence in the portfolio to cause more extreme outcomes.  
However, our results indicate that the extreme wealth outcomes occur mostly at the upper tail of 
the wealth distribution, which is actually favourable to the plan participant.  The measures for the 
extreme outcomes at the lower tail of retirement wealth distribution suggest that higher 
allocation to stocks do not necessarily increase the risk of confronting these adverse outcomes 
and in some cases, may even reduce their severity.  In our study, the risk of extremely adverse 
outcomes does not seem to vary considerably with change of asset allocation which implies that 
extreme loss aversion should have minimal role to play in the asset allocation decision for 
default investment options. 
The risk of investing in equities has been brought into sharp focus in the current environment 
of turmoil in the global financial markets. Does this undermine the results obtained in this paper? 
We do not think this to be true due to two reasons. First, the current slide in the stock market is 
still far below that witnessed during the Great Depression era, data from which have been 
included in our simulations. Second, as DeLong (2008) points out, a sharp downturn in stock 
prices due to sudden increase in perceived risk which is not accompanied by persistent collapses 
in corporate earnings of similar order is likely to be temporary in nature. Such situations actually 
present a stronger reason for long horizon investors to tilt their portfolios towards stocks. If the 
worst case scenario of steep and persistent fall in corporate earnings plays out in reality, bonds 
are not likely to prove any safer. Also, in such an environment, several doses of government 
fiscal packages to boost the economy would possibly result in inflation and massively erode the 
real wealth of bond investments. 
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Table 1a 
  Summary Statistics of Real Returns for Australian Stocks, Bonds, and Bills 
 
 
Stocks Bonds Bills 
 
PANEL A: 1900-2004 DATA 
 
Mean 0.0909 0.0226 0.0072 
Median 0.1100 0.0200 0.0100 
Maximum 0.5100 0.6200 0.1800 
Minimum -0.3800 -0.2700 -0.1600 
Standard Deviation 0.1774 0.1336 0.0551 
 
PANEL B: 1947-2004 DATA 
 
 Mean 0.0805 0.0108 0.0062 
 Median 0.1050 0.0200 0.0150 
 Maximum 0.5100 0.2700 0.0900 
 Minimum -0.3800 -0.2700 -0.1600 
 Standard Deviation 0.2106 0.1146 0.0508 
 
PANEL C: 1975-2004 DATA 
 
 Mean 0.1093 0.0496 0.0320 
 Median 0.1150 0.0900 0.0300 
 Maximum 0.5100 0.2700 0.0900 
 Minimum -0.2300 -0.1900 -0.0600 
 Standard Deviation 0.2053 0.1113 0.0376 
 
This table presents the summary statistics of annual real returns for Australian  
stocks, bonds, and bills for the full sample period 1900-2004 and two sub-sample  
periods 1947-2004 and 1975-2004. 
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Table 1b 
  Correlation between Real Returns for Australian Stocks, Bonds, and Bills 
 
 Stocks Bonds Bills 
 
PANEL A: 1900-2004 DATA 
 
Stocks 1.0000 0.3389 0.2524 
Bonds 0.3389 1.0000 0.6344 
Bills 0.2524 0.6344 1.0000 
 
PANEL B: 1947-2004 DATA 
 
Stocks 1.0000 0.3237 
 
0.2113 
Bonds 0.3237 
 
1.0000 0.6406 
 
Bills 0.2113 
 
0.6406 
 
1.0000 
 
PANEL C: 1975-2004 DATA 
 
Stocks 1.0000 0.0542 -0.0671 
Bonds 0.0542 1.0000 0.4207 
Bills -0.0671 0.4207 1.0000 
 
This table presents the correlation coefficients between annual real returns  
for Australian stocks, bonds, and bills for the full sample period 1900-2004 and  
two sub-sample periods 1947-2004 and 1975-2004 
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Table 2  
Asset Allocation of Stylized Default Investment Options 
 
STRATEGIES Stocks (%) Bonds (%) Cash (%) 
    
 
Defensive 
66 29 5 
 
Moderate 
76 22 2 
 
Aggressive 
85 13 2 
 
Default Option Average 
67 26 7 
 
100% Stocks 
100 0 0 
 
This table provides the asset allocation of the three stylised investment strategies (defensive, moderate, and aggressive), the 
default option average (DOA) strategy and 100% stocks strategy. The asset allocation of the „defensive‟ strategy represents 
the average asset allocation of the default investment options of the eight „platinum rated‟ funds whose allocation to stocks 
is less than 70%. The „moderate strategy‟s asset allocation is the average of the default investment options of the four 
„platinum rated‟ funds whose allocation to stocks is between 70% and 80%. The „aggressive‟ strategy has an asset 
allocation which is the average asset allocation of the default investment options of the five „platinum rated‟ funds whose 
allocation to stocks is above 80%. 
    
    
 
 28 
Table 3 
Distribution Parameters of Retirement Wealth Ratio (RWR) 
 
STRATEGIES Mean Median Max. Min. Q1 Q3 CV IQRR 
 
PANEL A: SIMULATION RESULTS BASED ON 1900-2004 DATA 
 
Defensive 
 
9.87 
 
8.34 
 
81.11 
 
1.38 
 
5.80 
 
12.17 
 
0.62 
 
0.76 
 
Moderate 
 
11.63 
 
9.49 
 
92.89 
 
1.26 
 
6.34 
 
14.51 
 
0.69 
 
0.86 
 
Aggressive 
 
13.71 
 
10.91 
 
129.16 
 
1.38 
 
6.98 
 
16.98 
 
0.75 
 
0.92 
 
Default Option Average 
 
9.90 
 
8.37 
 
72.27 
 
1.69 
 
5.84 
 
12.34 
 
0.62 
 
0.78 
 
100% Stocks 
 
17.37 
 
12.88 
 
194.55 
 
1.13 
 
7.78 
 
21.48 
 
0.90 
 
1.06 
         
PANEL B: SIMULATION RESULTS BASED ON 1947-2004 DATA 
         
 
Defensive 
 
7.76 
 
6.32 
 
77.41 
 
0.93 
 
4.22 
 
9.53 
 
0.71 
 
0.84 
 
Moderate 
 
9.09 
 
6.98 
 
101.60 
 
0.90 
 
4.51 
 
11.31 
 
0.81 
 
0.98 
 
Aggressive 
 
10.76 
 
7.81 
 
179.96 
 
0.74 
 
4.75 
 
13.07 
 
0.96 
 
1.06 
 
Default Option Average 
 
7.77 
 
6.31 
 
87.21 
 
0.99 
 
4.29 
 
9.49 
 
0.71 
 
0.82 
 
100% Stocks 
 
13.63 
 
8.92 
 
228.03 
 
0.76 
 
5.11 
 
16.54 
 
1.14 
 
1.28 
 
PANEL C: SIMULATION RESULTS BASED ON 1975-2004 DATA 
         
 
Defensive 
 
16.42 
 
13.50 
 
146.22 
 
1.81 
 
9.04 
 
20.44 
 
0.69 
 
0.84 
 
Moderate 
 
19.29 
 
15.09 
 
249.66 
 
1.48 
 
9.60 
 
23.84 
 
0.81 
 
0.94 
 
Aggressive 
 
22.45 
 
16.42 
 
346.70 
 
1.31 
 
9.90 
 
27.76 
 
0.92 
 
1.08 
 
Default Option Average 
 
16.32 
 
13.42 
 
130.57 
 
1.71 
 
8.97 
 
20.40 
 
0.68 
 
0.85 
 
100% Stocks 
 
28.15 
 
18.17 
 
460.72 
 
1.34 
 
9.78 
 
33.45 
 
1.19 
 
1.30 
 
Table 3 reports the distribution of RWR from the Monte Carlo simulation (multivariate normal).  A total of 5,000 iterations for 
every asset allocation strategy under consideration has been conducted to generate different investment return paths over 40-year 
periods.  Max., Min., Q1, and Q3 denote maximum, minimum, first quartile, and third quartile RWR outcomes respectively.  CV 
and IQRR measure the dispersion of RWR outcomes and stands for coefficient of variation and interquartile range ratio for the 
distribution of RWR outcomes respectively. 
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Table 4 
Estimates for Downside Risk and Performance Measures 
 
 
STRATEGIES 0LPM  1LPM  2LPM  SR  UPR  
PANEL A: SIMULATION RESULTS BASED ON 1900-2004 DATA 
 
 
Defensive 
 
0.4719 
 
1.1608 
 
3.9099 
 
0.9465 
 
1.5335 
 
Moderate 
 
0.3920 
 
0.9510 
 
3.2046 
 
2.0339 
 
2.5650 
 
Aggressive 
 
0.3240 
 
0.7813 
 
2.6410 
 
3.5427 
 
4.0229 
 
Default Option Average 
 
0.4696 
 
1.1455 
 
3.8546 
 
0.9681 
 
1.5516 
 
100% Stocks 
 
0.2622 
 
0.6415 
 
2.2062 
 
6.3074 
 
6.7393 
 
PANEL B: SIMULATION RESULTS BASED ON 1947-2004 DATA 
  2.0445 8.2208 -0.0840 0.6290 
 
Defensive 
 
0.6520 
 
2.0445 
 
8.2208 
 
-0.0840 
 
0.6290 
 
Moderate 
 
0.5773 
 
1.8048 
 
7.2803 
 
0.4019 
 
1.0708 
 
Aggressive 
 
0.5179 
 
1.6236 
 
6.6785 
 
1.0751 
 
1.7032 
 
Default Option Average 
 
0.6512 
 
2.0240 
 
8.0674 
 
-0.0794 
 
0.6333 
 
100% Stocks 
 
0.4494 
 
1.4613 
 
6.2095 
 
2.2612 
 
2.8477 
 
 1.8048 7.2803 0.4019 1.0708 
 
PANEL C: SIMULATION RESULTS BASED ON 1975-2004 DATA 
      
 
Defensive 
0.1892 0.3738 1.0884 8.0830 8.4413 
 
Moderate 
0.1756 0.3726 1.1485 10.5329 10.8807 
 
Aggressive 0.1688 0.3856 1.2764 12.7748 13.1164 
 
Default Option Average 
 
0.1868 
 
0.3744 
 
1.1073 
 
7.9102 
 
8.2659 
 
100% Stocks 
 
0.1812 
 
0.4641 
 
1.6793 
 
15.551 
 
15.9092 
 
 1.6236 6.6785 1.0751 1.7032 
 
Table 4 reports estimates for downside risk and performance measures from the Monte Carlo simulation.  OLPM , 1LPM , and 
2LPM measure downside risk and represent lower partial moment with degree )(  0, 1, and 2 respectively.  The downside risk 
adjusted performance measures SR and UPR denote Sortino ratio and upside potential ratio respectively.  A target retirement wealth ratio 
( TRWR ) of 8.0 has been used in the simulations to estimate these measures. 
 
 2.0240 8.0674 -0.0794 0.6333 
  1.4613 6.2095 2.2612 2.8477 
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Table 5 
Tail Risk Estimates for RWR Distribution 
 
 
STRATEGIES VaR ETL 
 
PANEL A: SIMULATION RESULTS BASED ON 1900-2004 DATA 
 
Defensive 
 
3.3936 
 
2.8416 
 
Moderate 
 
3.4528 
 
2.8546 
 
Aggressive 
 
3.3961 
 
2.7940 
 
Default Option Average 
 
3.4616 
 
2.8893 
 
100% Stocks 
 
4.0033 
 
3.2043 
 
PANEL B: SIMULATION RESULTS BASED ON 1947-2004 DATA 
   
 
Defensive 
 
2.4104 
 
1.9786 
 
Moderate 
 
2.5638 
 
2.0846 
 
Aggressive 
 
2.4318 
 
1.9809 
 
Default Option Average 
 
2.5196 
 
2.028 
 
100% Stocks 
 
2.4100 
 
1.8323 
 
PANEL C: SIMULATION RESULTS BASED ON 1975-2004 DATA 
 
 
Defensive 
 
5.0125 
 
4.1038 
 
Moderate 
 
5.2719 
 
4.2175 
 
Aggressive 
 
5.1698 
 
4.1914 
 
Default Option Average 
 
5.1974 
 
4.1088 
 
100% Stocks 
 
4.3970 
 
3.2636 
 
Table 5 reports tail risk estimates for the RWR Distribution from the Monte Carlo simulation.  Value at Risk (VaR) and Expected 
Tail Loss (ETL) for RWR outcomes are estimated at 95% confidence level.  Therefore, there is a 5% probability of the RWR 
falling below the VaR estimate. Conditional to the RWR falling below VaR i.e. for the worst 5% of RWR outcomes, the expected 
value is given by ETL. 
 
